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Parades of Horribles, Circles of Hell: Ethical
Dimensions of the Publication Controversy
David S.Caudill*

[Albandon every hope, you who enter.
Dante Alighieri, Inferno (Canto 111:9)1

Introduction: Paradesof Horribles
Rhetorical recourse to a "parade of horribles" need not have a pejorative

connotation. In policy debates, for example, opponents and proponents of a
new rule or regulation typically rely on predictions of the adverse effects of
accepting or rejecting, respectively, the proposal. Sometimes the benefits of a
particular course of action-whether to change or to keep a law-will outweigh
the realistically identified burdens.
Nevertheless, in the controversy
surrounding proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Rule 32.1)2

and publication practices generally, many suspect that the dueling parades of
horribles are exaggerated. Indeed, as Professor Stephen Barnett points out, if
Rule 32.1 would be as disastrous as its opponents claim, then the majority of
federal circuits would be rushing to prohibit citation of unpublished opinions in
their own rules.3 Conversely, if prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions
*
Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova University School of Law.
Professor Caudill, the chair of the law center symposium in which an earlier version of this
paper was presented, was at that time Professor of Law and Alumni Faculty Fellow at
Washington and Lee University School of Law. He acknowledges the Summer (2005) Research
Grant, to support completion of this manuscript, from Villanova University School of Law.
1. DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO 55 (Canto 111:9) (Robert M. Durling ed. & trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1996).
2. Rule 32.1, entitled "Citing Judicial Dispositions," is a proposed amendment published
for comment in August 2003 by the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules. If adopted, the
rule would allow citation to unpublished opinions in every federal circuit. COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND

31-32 (Aug. 2003).
3. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog That Did Not Bark: No-CitationRules, Judicial
Conference Rulemaking, and FederalPublicDefenders, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1491, 1550CRDIINAL PROCEDURE

51 (2005) ("If... predictions of adverse effects from citability... are accurate, we would
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was as problematic as the proponents of Rule 32.1 claim, then the four circuits
that prohibit citation would embrace the salvation offered by Rule 32.1.
Because both "systems" of citation are currently in place, both sides in the Rule
32.1 debate can claim that the other side has no evidence to support its
predictive parade of horribles.
As to the broader but related issue of whether current publication practices
are pragmatically necessary or extremely troubling, both sides in that debate
also enlist parades of horribles (that are likewise susceptible to charges of
exaggeration). 4 Significantly, supporters of such practices as unpublication and
depublication predict a dire situation if it were otherwise, while critics seek to
disclose the hidden parade of horribles that now exists. Finally, when
defenders of no-citation rules and the practice of writing unpublished opinions
respond, they unwittingly create a parade of horribles by virtue of their
justificatory revelations. I have mentioned lots of parades here, so let me
explain.
The first parade of horribles, offered in support of Rule 32.1, includes
(i) the hardships on attorneys who have to figure out the conflicting citation
rules in each circuit; (ii) First Amendment and prior restraint concerns ("nocitation rules... are profoundly antithetical to American values"5); (iii) the
dissonance between no-citation rules and the fact that unpublished opinions are
available, insightful, used by attorneys, and cited by judges; (iv) arbitrariness
and injustice because similar cases may not be treated alike; (v) lack ofjudicial
accountability and loss of public confidence in the judiciary; and (vi) the
appearance-perhaps reality-that wealthy litigants get published opinions
while the poor do not.6 If this parade appears to you to be exaggerated, thenwith apologies to comedian Jeff Foxworthy-you may be an opponent of Rule
7
32.1.
expect to see some evidence of such effects in the circuits where unpublished opinions are
citable.").
4. Regarding pragmatic necessities, see generally Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of
UnpublishedOpinions,60 Oa1o ST. L.J. 177 (1999); regarding the extremely troubling aspects
of current publication practices, see generally Penelope Pether, InequitableInjunctions: The
Scandal ofPrivateJudging in the US. Courts,56 STAN. L. REv. 1435 (2004).
5. Memorandum from Patrick J.Schiltz, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, to Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 46 (March 18, 2004) [hereinafter Schiltz
Memorandum] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See id. at 46-58 (discussing arguments for adopting Rule 32.1).
7. For those readers unfamiliar with this Southern cultural reference, Jeff Foxworthy, star
of the current television show Blue CollarTV(Warner Bros.), became famous in the 1990s with
his "You might be a redneck.. ." routine. See, e.g., JEFF FOXWORTHY, THE BEST OF JEFF
FOXWORTHY: DOUBLE WIDE, SINGLE MINDED (Warner Bros. Records 2003) ("If you've ever cut
your grass and found a car, you might be a redneck.").
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The second parade of horribles, offered by opponents of Rule 32.1, is even
bigger, reflecting both the benign fact that opposition to a controversial
proposal is traditionally more likely than support8 and the unseemly fact that the
opposition to Rule 32.1 was an organized campaign-repetitive, even identical,
comments were sent to the Committee, and about ninety percent of the more
than five hundred comments received were opposed to Rule 32.1.9 This parade
of horribles includes the following predictions: (i) judges will be misled by
illegitimate citation of unpublished opinions; (ii) judges will be overwhelmed
by the duty to write better unpublished opinions and consequently have less
time to write published opinions, thereby rendering the (actual) law less clear,
leading to more litigation and even greater demands on judges' time, all of
which will result in more one-line dispositions; (iii) the body of case law will
be (somewhat contradictorily, given the previous prediction) vastly increased,
imposing a hardship on attorneys; and (iv) parties will have to wait longer for
judicial resolution, which costs money and discriminates against the poor.' 0
In the broader debate over publication practices generally, the parades of
horribles offered by defenders and critics overlap somewhat with the two Rule
32.1 parades. Defenders of the unpublication practice point to the crises that
led to current practices, including overwhelming precedent, technological and
storage problems and inefficiencies, and increasing judicial workloads. Critics
highlight the sacrifice of principled decisionmaking, the loss of judicial
legitimacy, compromises of transparency and accountability, an increased
inconsistency or lack of uniformity, the advantaging of repeat-players, and the
corresponding subordination of the poor and marginalized."
8. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 1502 n.52 ("It's quite typical in these rules matters that
the overwhelming letters, particularly on a controversial matter, will be opposed. There's
almost a tradition of that." (quoting Judge David F. Levi, Transcript of Hearing Before Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules 121 (April 13, 2004), http://www.nonpublication.com/
aphearing.doc)).
9. See Schiltz Memorandum, supranote 5, at 1-2 (describing the ways in which "[t]he
comments were highly unusual").
10. See id. at 34-46 (discussing arguments against adopting Rule 32.1). For an argument
that this parade of horribles is exaggerated, see Stephen R. Barnett, In Support of Proposed
FederalRule of Appellate Procedure32.1: A Reply to JudgeAlex Kozinski, THE FED. LAW.,
Nov./Dec. 2004, at 32.
11. See Martin, supra note 4, at 180 (cataloging some of the criticisms to which Judge
Martin responds: "loss of precedent.., sloppy decisions... lack of uniformity... difficulty of
higher court review... unfairness to litigants [who] deserve published opinions ...less judicial
accountability... less predictability"). See also Pether, supranote 4, at 1439-41 stating that:
[T]hree main practices of private judging [have] developed in the U.S. Courtscontemporary unpublication, depublication, and stipulated withdrawal ....
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A fifth and final parade of horribles arises from these debates almost in
reverse or by accident-I refer here to the response by Judge Kozinski to
criticism of the no-citation rule, a response which also defends the practice of
unpublication as a necessity.12 Judge Kozinski's famous January 16, 2004
letter to Judge Alito, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
was intended to comfort the offended by offering a reality-check, an insider's
view of why designating some opinions as unpublished was not a horror to be
feared. In the process of explaining, however, Judge Kozinski horrified many
readers. For example, Kozinski wrote that unpublished opinions are simply not
"safe as precedent" given "the press of our cases"; that many such "cases are
badly briefed" and, "[q]uite often, there is a severe disparity in the quality of
lawyering between the parties"; and that "unpublished dispositions-unlike
opinions-are often drafted entirely by law clerks and staff attorneys"13-- cold
comfort to litigants and hardly reassurance that the status quo needs no serious
reform.
In similar testimony before the House, Judge Kozinski, according to one
scholar, heretically argued that if unpublished
decisions were citable,... the judges might have "to pay much closer
attention to their precise wording," [or] "agree on the precise reasoning,"
the judges who dissent from the result might have to make that fact known,
and judges not on the panel might "have 1to
4 pay much closer attention" to
the decisions written by their colleagues.
The author goes on to state that "[Kozinski's] rationalizations.., are not only
outrageous, but in my view, violate the fundamental principles of the... Code
of Judicial Conduct."1 5 Indeed, the very notion that unpublished opinions are
[These practices] sacrifice principled decisionmaking... [and] imperil the
legitimacy of the judicial system and thus the rule of law....[T]here is credible
evidence of the tendency for the practices of private judging to corrupt the
operation of the courts and the administration of justice ....

Id.
12. See Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to
Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (Jan. 16,2004)
[hereinafter Kozinski Letter] (explaining Judge Kozinski's opposition to Rule 32.1) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See id.
at 4-6 (arguing that treating an unpublished disposition "as a citable precedent
[is] a time bomb").
14. Lawrence J. Fox, Those UnpublishedOpinions: An AppropriateExpedience or an
Abdication of Responsibility?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1215, 1222 (2004) (quoting Unpublished
Judicial Opinions: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual

Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 13 (2002) (statement of Judge Alex
Kozinski), availableat http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/107th/80454.pdf).
15. Id.
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written quickly by court staff or law clerks can be (if you put yourself in the
position of an anxious litigant on appeal) scandalous, depending on your
position in the publication controversy and on which parades of horribles you
think are exaggerated.
The purpose of this Article is to explore some of the ethical dimensions of
the publication controversy. As I will show, there are different types of ethical
challenges or dilemmas for lawyers and judges in each ofthe several "levels" of
the controversy. In terms of Dante's Inferno, lawyers and judges are
condemned to different fates depending on the "circle of Hell" in which they
find themselves. Recall that in the structure of Dante's Hell, occupants of
different levels suffer differently, with relatively little suffering in the first
circle of Hell, but significantly more suffering in the lower circles; indeed, the
suffering increases at each level in proportion to the seriousness of the sin that
is being punished.
In my first circle of Hell, I identify ethical problems created by no-citation
rules. In the second circle of Hell, I identify ethical problems that arise from
the current context of publication practices generally. The third circle of Hell
represents what has been called the trend toward privatization of law, or "the
end of law" as we know it, wherein a different set of ethical dimensions can be
identified. It is my hope that this taxonomy helps explain why the heated
controversy over Rule 32.1-which appears to some to be a tempest in a teapot
or "Much Ado About Little"' 6-is so polarizing and important. In short, the
Rule 32.1 debate signifies a much deeper problem.
The Rule Against Citation: The First Circle of Hell
Anyone who states that lawyers andjudgeshave a common understanding
ofhow to handle unpublisheddecisions is either misinformedor less than
candid.17
Comparatively speaking, the first circle of Hell in Dante's InfernoLimbo-is not that bad. For those virtuous unbelievers at this level who died
unbaptized or otherwise preceded Christ, there is no physical suffering, but
there is mental anguish in the knowledge that one will never see Him. 18 Homer
16. Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explainingthe Sturm Und Drang Over the
Citationof Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429 (2005).
17. Bennett Evan Cooper, Public Comment 03-AP-432, Proposed Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 13, 2004), quoted in Schiltz Memorandum, supranote 5, at 94,
availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-025.pdf.
18. See ALIGIER1, supra note 1, at 73 (Canto IV: 31-43). The following passage is
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and Ovid, Socrates and Plato, Democritus and Euclid, among others, are
suspended in Limbo, many of whom live in a "noble castle" surrounded "by a
lovely little stream."19
Likewise, the ethical dilemmas faced by attorneys because of no-citation
rules are indirect and somewhat speculative. For example, the variation across
circuits as to citation of unpublished opinions "means that practitioners face
sanctions if they cite unpublished cases in certain circuits, yet risk negligence if
they fail to do so in others., 2 0 This risk exists throughout the law, and therefore
seems minimal. Indeed, Judge Kozinski remarks that the "argument that
lawyers have difficulty figuring out the applicable rule doesn't pass the straightface test.",2' A competent attorney will follow the applicable rules. As if that
aphorism needed clarification, the ABA issued a formal ethics opinion
concerning the propriety of citing an unpublished opinion in a no-citation
jurisdiction.22 The opinion concludes that such conduct violates Model Rule
3.4(c), which prohibits "knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal,, 23 and creative attempts to circumvent the prohibition-by calling
the court's attention to a prior decision for whatever use the court might make
of it-were condemned as well.24
A more significant dilemma, perhaps, created by unpublished opinions is
the choice attorneys face as to what constitutes competent research. Attorney
rules of professional conduct require competence, diligence, good faith claims,

illustrative:
My good master [Virgil] said to me: "You do not ask what spirits are these you
see? Now I wish you to know, before you walk further,
that they did not sin; and if they have merits, it is not enough, because they did not
receive baptism, which is the gateway to the faith that you believe.
And if they lived before Christianity, they did not adore God as was needful: and
of this kind am I myself.
Because of such defects, not for any other wickedness, we are lost, and only so far
harmed that without hope we live in desire."
Id.
19. Id. at 75-77 (Canto IV:85-144); id at 75 (Canto IV: 106-08) ("We came to the foot of
a noble castle, seven times encircled by high walls, defended all around by a lovely little
stream.").
20. David S. Law, Strategic JudicialLawmaking: Ideology, Publication,and Asylum
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 817, 819 (2005).
21. Kozinski Letter, supra note 12, at 18.
22. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-386R (1995)
(discussing the citation of unpublished opinions in courts that prohibit such citation).
23. Id.(quoting MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDuCTR. 3.4(c) (1983)).
24. Id.
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and candor toward the tribunal.25 If noncitable opinions are not precedential,
but nevertheless represent prior decisions of a court, how are they to be used?
For example:
Consider a lawyer counseling a client concerning a proposed course of
action. If the only legal authority on point is a noncitable case that permits
the conduct, what advice can the lawyer properly give? Or what if the
noncitable opinion forbids the conduct? Can the lawyer tell the client that
he or she is safe to proceed because an adversary could not cite a case that
has prohibited it? What if, during litigation, a lawyer asserts that an old
precedent has never been followed? If the case has in fact been followed
many times, albeit in uncitable opinions [that] merely "restate" the law, is
his or her adversary expected to remain mute and thereby deprive the court
of information helpful in evaluating... the case? These scenarios present
awkward ethical problems.26
In another formulation of this dilemma, the president of the Los Angeles
County Bar Association recently remarked:
One thing we don't know is what happens to the lawyer who misses
Some disappointed client might sue for
nonpublished cases.
malpractice ....It's not that people don't look at unpublished opinions
27
now; they do. The difference is the priority you have to give them.
Significantly, the problems of legal research--deciding what to read, how
much weight to give to unpublished opinions, and what to use-persist
regardless of no-citation rules. Both sides in the Rule 32.1 debate take the
moral high ground and parade out the hardships their opponent's position
creates for attorneys. Rule 32.1 supposedly increases the burdens of research
because if unpublished "opinions were published and citable, lawyers would
have to search them to confirm that nothing useful was in them, thereby
increasing the cost of legal research. 2 8 Similarly, no-citation rules supposedly
deprive attorneys of potentially useful insights and information from
unpublished opinions-advocates are handicapped by not being able to cite a
case with facts similar to their own.29
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, 3.3 (2004).
26. David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The CensorialJudiciary,35 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 1133, 1157 (2002) (citations omitted).
27. Stephanie Francis Ward, Giving Their Opinions: Committee Backs Rule Allowing
Lawyers to Cite UnpublishedDecisions,A.B.A. J. E-REP. (ABA Journal, Chicago, Ill.), Apr. 23,
2004 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the CaliforniaAppellate System, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 433,
492 (1994).
29. See Schiltz Memorandum, supra note 5, at 47-48 (noting that unpublished opinions
are often valuable resources).
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Giving the benefit of the doubt to the proponents of such arguments, these
hardships tend to cancel each other out-hardships will occur using either
system of citation. Of course, the proponents of Rule 32.1 view the critics'
argument with suspicion-attorneys already research unpublished opinions "so
as to be able to advise clients about the legality of their conduct, predict the
outcome of litigation, and get ideas about how to frame and argue issues before
the court. 30 Conversely, opponents of Rule 32.1 claim that allowing citation to
an unpublished opinion that was likely written by a staff attorney, as if the
opinion represents the view of the court, "is a particularly subtle and insidious
'
form of fraud. 31
Rule 32.1 also facilitates fraud by creating "a veritable
amusement park for lawyers fond of playing games," who can use some of the
"zillion" unpublished opinions that "tend to be thin on the facts, and written in
loose, sloppy language. 3 2 Attorneys have learned to deal with whatever system
in which they work, and they do not seem to be forced into acting unethicallyincompetently, dishonestly, or undiligently-in either system.
A more serious set of problems is associated with the question of what to
do with unpublished opinions-what to read, use, and value. These ethical
dilemmas are a product of nonpublication practices generally in every
jurisdiction. Professor Fox, for example, argues that "any interference with my
ability to be as zealous and33effective an advocate as I can be," such as nocitation rules, is frustrating:
Here I am providing the court with all the reasons why my client should
prevail, [bringing] anything to the attention of the court that I think might
be persuasive....
But the one thing I cannot cite is an unpublished opinion written by real
judges who sat on the very court before whom I appear in a case that
involved real litigants in a real dispute that was actually decided using the
English language
as a way of informing the litigants how the court reached
4
its decision.1
The problem, of course, is that because of current publication practices the
unpublished opinion may not have been written by real judges and it may not

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
act with

Id.at 58.
Kozinski Letter, supranote 12, at 7.
Id.at21.
Fox, supra note 14, at 1218.
Id.at 1217-18; cf MODELRuLESOFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.3 (2004) ("A lawyer shall
reasonable diligence.., in representing a client.").
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discussed
reflect how the real judges reached a decision. And those practices,
35
against."
"rail[ing]
is
Fox
what
really
are
section,
next
in the

PublicationPractices: The Second Circle of Hell
And I came to aplace where no light shines.
Dante Alighieri, Inferno (Canto IV: 151)36
In the second circle of Hell, Dante first confronts those who are punished
for their sins, and the scene is grim: "much weeping assails" him, "all light is
silent," and the "infernal whirlwind, which never rests, drives the spirits before
its violence; turning and striking, it tortures them. 3 7 Dante is here supposed to
learn "to despise the lustful because they blaspheme Divine Justice which has
39
placed them here, 38 but he fails the test and sympathizes with them,
4
0
eventually fainting, overcome with pity. Moreover, Dante alludes to a certain
solidarity or companionship as the sinners in the second circle of Hell weather
41
an infernal storm-while one spirit speaks, the other weeps. They do not
suffer alone.
The sense that "we are all in the same boat" also characterizes the history
of publication practices, which transcends the Rule 32.1 debate by implicating
all judges and lawyers. A dilemma for lawyers arises because they have to
guess about the potential authority and value of unpublished opinions-the
opinions might reflect the court's opinion, but they might not. As Professor
Fox has noted:
If in fact judges reach the same result, but for different reasons, are not the
litigants-if not the entire world-absolutely entitled to know that fact?
Embedded in that undisclosed difference is a real opportunity for the party
who loses the appeal to seek further review. The failure to agree on the
35.

See Fox, supra note 14, at 1218 (criticizing Rule 32.1 as an "interference" with his

ability to be a "zealous and effective advocate").
36. AUIGHERI, supra note 1, at 79 (Canto IV: 15 1).
37. See id. at 87, 89 (Canto V:26-27, 28, 31-33) (describing the second circle of Hell).
38. DANTE's INFERNO: THE INDIANA CRITICAL EDMON 52 (Mark Musa ed. & trans.,
1995).
39. See ALIGHIERI, supra note 1, at 93 (Canto V: 116-17) ("Francesca, your sufferings
make me sad and piteous to tears.").
40. See id. (Canto V:140) ("[F]or pity I fainted as if I were dying.").

41.

Id. (Canto V:139).
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principle that supports the result-if it were disclosed... could demonstrate
how tenuous the result really is .... 42

How is it possible to be competent in the system in which we learned to predict
the outcomes of controversies, if the cases most like ours have an unusually
indeterminate status? On the other hand, this is just an ethical strain because
we are all in the same boat. The competence and diligence required by the
rules of professional conduct are interpreted according to the conventions and
practices of most lawyers, so it would be difficult to identify a violation on the
basis of a "guess" about the status of an unpublished opinion.
A different set of ethical dilemmas arises for the judiciary in the era of
unpublished opinions. As Professor Fox has noted:
First, the Code [of Judicial Conduct] tells judges that they shall perform
their duties "diligently... ." [A] lawyer who failed to perform assiduously
because he was too busy would have that excuse fall on deaf ears ....
[D]oesn't [that] mean that judges should not facilitate underfunding of the
judiciary by delivering second class justice[?]
Second, judges are to be "faithful to the law.... ." [J]udges have no
greater calling than to decide cases fairly, impartially, consistently, and
with a full explanation to the parties of the basis for the decision....

Third,

judges

are

admonished

to

maintain

"professional

competence.... " [Doesn't] a judge who fails to write opinions with

sufficient clarity of language and adequate consideration of
43the opinion's
precedential value violat[e] the obligation of competence?
These arguments, made by Professor Fox in the context of his criticism of nocitation rules, apply equally to the broader practice of unpublication. Of
course, the practice of issuing unpublished opinions is ajudicial convention-a
systematic problem not likely to lead to sanctions. Nevertheless, judges are
arguably forced, by an overwhelming workload, to compromise the ideals set
forth in the Code of Judicial Conduct. But, an even broader problem exists,
with ethical implications for the profession. The practice of issuing

42.

Fox, supra note 14, at 1223.
Id.at 1225-26 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990), which is
titled "A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office... Diligently," and Canon 3(B)(2),
which states that "A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in

43.

it").
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unpublished opinions is symptomatic of the end, or privatization, of law in
some fields of practice.
Privatization: The Third Circle of Hell
Gluttony ...has none of the potential charm of lust. [In the thirdcircle,
it] is punishedby eternalgroveling in mire andfilth. Whereas lust has the
possibility of companionship, here each is alone in his degradation,cold
and miserable.44

With respect to the end of law, we are not all in the same boat. There is no
rule or nationwide practice of privatizing law, but it happens in some fields of
law-so it lacks the charm of universality. For example, Professor Carr and
attorney Michael Jencks highlight the privatization of dispute resolution in the
field of business law.45 Though the common law of reported decisions
traditionally developed "rules for allocating risk and deciding business and
commercial disputes," 46 that system has been weakened by alternative dispute
47
resolution (and judicial support of such privatization), "managerial judging,
"the bureaucratization of the judiciary, ', 4 8 and "the increased use of vacatur,
rules, depublication, filings
selective publication and the adoption of no-citation
49
settlements.,
confidential
and
under seal
As to the ethical dimensions of privatization, Diane Karpman warns that
California's Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act
could together create "a future without reported decisions involving legal
malpractice":
If every California lawyer included a binding arbitration clause for client
claims, public decisional law regarding legal malpractice would disappear.

44. SETH ZIMMERMAN, Canto VI, in SUMMARIES AND DIAGRAMS,at http://home.earth
link.net/-,zimls/summaries.html#6 (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (summarizing Zimmerman's

translation of DANTE ALIGHIERI,

INFERNO

(Canto VI) (n.d.)) (on file with the Washington and

Lee Law Review).
45. See Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of Business and

Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183, 198-209
(2000) (discussing this trend).

46.

Id. at 185.

47.
48.
49.

Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
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•.. Once the [fee arbitration] "experience" is over, the client is back in
binding arbitration of the remaining claims. Nothing involving attorney
malpractice need see the light of day.50

Some "smart practitioners," therefore, may avoid the publicity of "publicly
litigated claims of negligence." 5'
Professor Judith Resnik suggests that alongside the twentieth-century
trend toward increased "access to and reliance on adjudicatory" sites, "new
doctrines and norms... support several kinds of 'alternatives,' many of which
lack adjudication's transparency. The result is diminished reliance on and
support for public processes. 5 2 She has noted:
With "vanishing trials" comes fewer adjudicatory moments for the public to
witness.... [C]ourt-based [alternative dispute resolution] processes often
involve decisions by state-empowered actors who influence outcomes
through informal discussions with lawyers and litigants that are aimed at
"nudging" them to settlement. Some of those settlements are "sealed," and
sometimes those agreements also put materials produced through discovery
under wraps....

[The concurrent, conflicting trend toward increased access to
adjudicatory sites] may also render adjudication obsolete, as its specificity
becomes uncomfortable when it produces visible disparities across
similarly situated individuals.53
One can imagine numerous areas of law where the anonymity of
alternative dispute resolution would be appreciated by those accused and
troubling to those wronged-civil rights, consumer protection, employment
discrimination, and so forth. For the purposes of this Article, attorney
malpractice and claims of ethical violations are paradigms of these phenomena.
Private adjudication or settlement of such disputes hinders the development of
norms and guidelines (through precedent) and thereby increases the risk of
inconsistent outcomes and differential treatment of like parties. The law
governing lawyers is thereby impoverished-an ethical "burden" of sorts. But
this is only part of the larger problem of the ethical burden imposed on lawyers
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Diane Karpman, Take a Close Look at Binding Arbitration,CAL. B.J., June 2004, at
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Id.

52.

Judith Resnik, Procedure'sProjects,23 CIV. JUST. Q. 273, 273 (2004).

53.

Id. at 302-03 (citations omitted).
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who inherit an impoverished body of precedent in any area of law: they cannot
predict outcomes and advise clients with confidence.
Professors Perschbacher and Bassett call this privatization trend the "end of
law," 54 -the unintended result of settlement processes and their encouragement, 55
arbitration and private judging, 56 deferential standards of review, 57 the "harmless
59
error" doctrine,5 8 minimalist judicial "standards" rather than "rules," 61
60
unpublished opinions and memorandum dispositions, fewer oral arguments,
the U.S. Supreme Court's avoidance devices, 62 vacatur, 63 depublication, 64 and
stipulated reversal. 65 Though the "vanishing trial" is an obvious phenomenon,
less obvious is that,
[i]aw in the normative sense is vanishing-veiled by procedures that hide law
from view and eradicated by procedures that eliminate existing law. The
result of these procedures is privatized law, distorted norms, diminished case
resolution and explanation, and loss of the full landscape of law.66
Some people are astonished by these developments. But some commentators are
astonished that anyone would be astonished-of course the trial is disappearing,
and the only surprise is that anyone familiar with law would be surprised.67
54. See generally Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End ofLaw, 84 B.U.
L. REv. 1 (2004).
55. Id. at 16-27.
56. Id. at 28-32.
57. Id. at 36-38.
58. Id. at 38-40.
59. Id. at 40-42.
60. Id. at 42-46.
61. Id. at 47-48.
62. See id.at 48-54 (discussing certiorari, standing, mootness, ripeness, and limitations
on habeas review).
63. Id. at 54-56.
64. Id. at 56-59.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 62.
67. See Resnik, supranote 52, at 283 (giving reasons the adversary system is disappearing).
Critics of adversarial adjudication,
argue that adversary trials require extravagant investments of resources to yield
flawed conclusions. At the macro-level, the complaint is that "excessive adversarial
legalism" is a drain on economic productivity.
Others dislike adjudication's formalism that, they argue, promotes unnecessarily
prolonged conflicts. They propose more user-friendly, less adversarial processes....
Such commentators believe that processes such as mediation and arbitration are more
justice-generative than is adjudication.
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Conclusion: Discourses ofAstonishment
I agreewith those opponents ofRule 32.1 who ask, in essence: "What's the
Are no-citation
big deal? What's the problem crying outfor a solution?
8
rules really inflicting a lot ofharm on a lot ofpeople?',

Although I clerked for a federal court of appeals judge, practiced law in two
different states, and currently teach in a law school, I was astonished to learn how
many judicial opinions are designated "not for publication." Yet the controversy
over unpublished opinions is characterized by a discourse of astonishment. Most
judges seem to be astonished that I would be so naive. When those in the
judiciary explain their workload and situation, as Judge Kozinski did, critics are
astonished by their calm admission that unpublished opinions are "written in
loose, sloppy language" by law clerks. 69 Judges are, in turn, "baffled by"
concerns about a body of secret law, use of unpublished opinions to circumvent
the law, or special treatment for some parties.70 With respect to Rule 32.1,
Patrick Schiltz seems astonished that the controversy is so intense, 7' and Steven
Barnett is astonished that Schiltz recognizes the virtues of Rule 32.1 but
recommends no action at this time.72 Everyone is shocked.
Contrary to those who think that the publication controversy is not worth all
the time and effort spent debating current judicial practices, this is a big deal.
Ethically, it implicates the ability of lawyers and judges to do their jobs
competently. Though some lawyers may not consider no-citation rules a huge
problem, and though they may simply learn to live with the conventions of
nonpublication and privatization, the Rule 32.1 controversy represents and reveals
the problematic aspect of all of these phenomena-we do not have a principled
and transparent system ofjustice wherein judges are responsible for creating rules
and are accountable for inconsistencies. If that sounds exaggerated, you might be
an apologist for the status quo.

68. Schiltz Memorandum, supra note 5, at 90.
69. Kozinski Letter, supranote 12, at 4, 21.
70. Id. at 7.
71. See Schiltz Memorandum, supra note 5, at 89-90 ("For the most part, the advisory
committees identify technical problems and propose uncontroversial solutions.... As a result,
objections to proposed rules are usually neither many nor passionate.... Rule 32.1 is... one of
those rare proposals that is highly controversial.").
72. See id.at 95 (stating that Professor Barnett "does not share the Committee's concern
that judges who oppose Rule 32.1 will try to undermine it by imposing restrictions on the
citation of unpublished opinions").

